INTRODUCTION
For centuries, American Indians have regarded specific lands as essential to their livelihood, government, culture, and religion. Congress and the courts have at times recognized the important relationship between tribes and their lands. 2 Recognition has not always coincided with protection; during the nineteenth century and part of the twentieth century a series of governmental actions resulted in the tribes surrendering title and possession to many of their ancestral lands. 3 Recently, however, American Indians have become increasingly active litigants in a variety of contexts. 4 In one set of cases, Indians challenged government development projects on public lands, contending that because the projects interfered with Indian sacred sites, they violated the free exercise clause. 5 conviction, the Court stressed that actions as well as beliefs would now be afforded some manner of free exercise protection, noting that: [T] he Amendment embraces two concepts, -freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom. 10 The impact of cases such as Cantwell on free exercise analysis was unclear, however, since those cases simultaneously involved other important first amendment issues. 11 This problem was alleviated in Sherbert v. Verner, 12 where the Court confronted only a free exercise claim. 13 
B. Modern Approach to the Free Exercise Clause

Sherbert v. Verner
In Sherbert v. Verner, 14 the Court indicated that many forms of religiously based action would be entitled to free exercise protection, and correspondingly, that the government would face stricter limits on its ability to regulate such behavior. In Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist was discharged from her job because she would not work on Saturday, which was her Sabbath Day. Finding that appellant's religious reasons did not constitute "good cause" for her inability to work, the state denied her unemployment benefits. 15 In holding that appellant's disqualification from benefits violated her right to free exercise of religion, the Supreme Court enunciated a two-step approach for analyzing free exercise claims. First, claimant had to demonstrate that the state regulation or practice imposed a sub-10. 310 U.S. at 303-04 (footnote omitted). See also Pepper, supra note 8, at 329. 11. See Pepper, supra note 8, at 327 (arguing that "these cases are too intricately entwined with free speech, press and assembly considerations to assist significantly in a coherent, independent elaboration of the appropriate meaning of the free exercise clause"); Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 353 (1980) . 12. 374 U. S. 398 (1963) . 13. Two years before Sherbert, the Court addressed a distinct free exercise claim in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (1961) . In Braunfeld, orthodox Jewish merchants whose beliefs prevented them from conducting business on Saturday challenged the state's Sunday closing law. They argued that the law infringed on their free exercise rights, since in forcing them to close on both Saturday and Sunday it placed them at a financial disadvantage compared with their fellow merchants. The Court rejected the claim, stressing that the burden on religious practices was "indirect." 366 U.S. at 605-09. This indirect/direct analysis, however, seems to have been overruled by Sherbert. See text at note 19 infra.
14. 374 U. S. 398 (1963) . 15. 374 U.S. at 401.
stantial burden on the exercise of her religion. 16 Second, the burden was justified only if it was necessary to advance a "compelling state interest" that outweighed the impaired free exercise rights. 17 Furthermore, the state had to show that there were no less restrictive means which might serve its interests without impairing claimant's free exercise rights. 18 The Court found that appellant satisfied both steps of the analysis. The state argued that since the unemployment statute did not explicitly compel appellant to work on Saturday, it placed only an indirect burden on her religious practices. The Court held, however, that any distinction between "direct" or "indirect" burdens was irrelevant. Rather, a substantial burden on appellant's religion existed because the ruling forced "her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand." 19 Moreover, the Court was unwilling to assess the state interests offered to justify the statute, noting that the evidence was insufficient to show that persons would feign religious protest to Saturday work in order to collect compensation. State concerns with avoiding fraud and the disruption of scheduling were not the sort of "paramount interests" required to override appellant's religious interest. 20 The state also failed to demonstrate that there were no less restrictive means for attaining its goals. 2 1
Wisconsin v. Yoder
Wisconsin v. Yoder 22 is one of the most significant recent free exercise cases. In Yoder, members of the Old Order Amish religion were convicted under a state compulsory school attendance law when they refused to send their children to public school after the eighth grade or to enroll them in an alternative private school. 23 Following its analysis in Sherbert, the Court affirmed the state supreme court's reversal of the convictions on free exercise grounds. 2 4 Before reaching the two-step analysis developed in Sherbert, how- ever, the Court established several threshold criteria which defendants had to satisfy in order to state a free exercise claim. First, defendants were required to demonstrate that they sincerely followed a recognizable "religion." 25 Since the parties previously stipulated to the sincerity of the Amish religious beliefs, this inquiry was not a problem. 26 The second threshold criterion mandated that the actions for which defendants sought protection be "rooted in religious belief." 27 The Court contrasted these activities with those such as Thoreau's, which were based on personal and philosophical choice, rather than on religious belief: "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations .... " 2 8 The Amish way of life, however, was religiously based, and not "merely a matter of personal preference .... " 29 Indeed, the Court stressed that the Amish daily life and religious practices were derived from written scripture, and had been followed for nearly three hundred years by an organized, coherent religious group. 3 0 Third, the Court inquired into the connection between defendants' practices and their religious beliefs. It found that the Amish regarded their entire way of life, including their mode of education via "learning by doing," as closely related to their beliefs. 31 The Amish protest against formal education beyond the eighth grade was thus based on their "central religious concepts" calling for a life apart from worldly values and influences. 3 2 Having completed this series of threshold inquiries the Court then followed the two-step analysis advanced in Sherbert, noting that: [I] n order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of 25. 406 U.S. at 235. The Court has at times struggled with what constitutes a "religion" for purposes of the free exercise clause. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) ("religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection").
26. 406 U.S. at 209. Similarly, this criterion is not controversial in the sacred site cases where the parties frequently agree that the Indian religious beliefs asserted are sincerely held.
See notes 86-88 infra and accompanying text.
27. 406 U.S. at 215. 28. 406 U.S. at 215. The Court believed that this personal preference exception was necessary to prevent individuals from asserting their own moral standards as ways of circumventing the law. 406 U.S. at 215-16. Such concerns date back to Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) (an individual could not be allowed to become a "law unto himself").
29. 406 U.S. at 216. 30. 406 U.S. at 235 . Such an analysis would also seem to favor tribal claims derived from long-standing, organized religious practices.
31. The Court noted that the Amish lifestyle was "inseparable from and a part of the basic tenets of their religion ..•. " 406 U.S. at 219.
32. 406 U.S. at 210-11. In the sacred site cases, several courts transformed this "centrality" inquiry into the primary means for determining whether claimants' religious practices had been burdened by government development. See notes 88-125 infra and accompanying text. [Vol. 85:771 a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause. 33 Applying this analysis, the Court found that since the compulsory education statute exposed Amish children to worldly influences, attitudes, and goals that contravened their beliefs, and since it inhibited the adolescent's integration into the community, it imposed a severe burden on defendants' religious practices. 34 In addition, the asserted state interest in the compulsory education system did not override the burden on defendants' religious practices. While conceding that providing public schools ranked at the "very apex" of state functions, 35 the Court held that the two chief goals of the education system -preparing persons for political participation and promoting self-reliance -were just as readily satisfied by the Amish mode of education, so that granting defendants an exemption would not undermine these goals. 36 
II. EARLIER CASES ADDRESSING INDIAN RELIGIOUS CLAIMS
Free exercise claims asserted by American Indians in other settings have arisen from such matters as the unlawful taking and transportation of moose, 37 a prisoner wearing his hair in a traditional Indian style, 38 and the Native American Church's use of peyote in religious ceremonies. 39 The courts in these earlier cases were among the first to 33. 406 U.S. at 214. Moreover, as in Sherbert, the state had to demonstrate that its interests could not be served by less restrictive means. 406 U.S. at 235-36. 34. 406 U.S. at 217-18. Describing this burden on defendants' practices, the Court added that the compulsory school attendance law posed the "very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist today .
•.. " 406 U.S. at 218.
35. 406 U.S. at 213. 36. 406 U.S. at 221-23. Significantly, the Court evaluated the value of the Amish education system from the practitioners' viewpoint:
"It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two beyond the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the preparation of the child for life in modem society as the majority live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as the preparation of the child for life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of the Amish Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979 ), ajfd. mem., 633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980 State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973 ), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974 People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) ; In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964) apply the approach developed in Sherbert and Yoder to issues involving Indian religions, and their analysis provides a useful model for analyzing the sacred site cases. 40 This section focuses on these cases' treatment of key aspects of the free exercise analysis -the role of threshold criteria, the proper relationship between the centrality inquiry and the burden requirement, and the balancing of the respective interests of Indians and government.
A. Yoder's Threshold Criteria
The application of Yoder's threshold criteria 41 to Indian free exercise cases has proven problematic. For example, courts have found that the requirement that the claimant prove the sincerity of his or her beliefs creates a difficult tension. While this inquiry serves to strain out frivolous claims in which parties seek "to wear the mantle of religious immunity merely as a cloak for illegal activities," 42 a court that probes too deeply into the parties' sincerity might violate the established principle that the judiciary should not attempt definitions of orthodoxy. 43 Courts have negotiated this tension artfully by restricting the evidence they consider regarding sincerity. In People v. Woody, 44 the leading case addressing the use of peyote in ceremonies of the Native American Church, the court held that the sincerity inquiry was limited to "whether the defendants' belief in Peyotism is honest and in good faith." 45 This narrowed scope ensured that: "the court makes a factual examination of the bona fides of the belief and does not intrude into the religious issue at all; it does not determine the nature of the belief but the nature of defendants' adherence to it." 46 This good faith standard was easily satisfied by the Indian defendants in Woody, and has proven similarly easy to meet for Indians in many other cases. 47 40. Several of the sacred site cases referred to these earlier cases, but seem to have misinter- App. 27, 31, 504 P.2d 950, 954 (1973 App. 27, 31, 504 P.2d 950, 954 ( ), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974 Whitehorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539, 546 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) .
47. See, e.g., Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357, 361 (8th Cir. 1975 ) (court based finding of sincerity largely on defendant's statement that if he cut his long hair he "would feel spiritually just dead"); Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1073 (Alaska 1979) (because the trial court found the defendant to be sincere in his beliefs, " [t] he question of sincerity require [d] no extended discus- [Vol. 85:771 B. The Centrality Inquiry and the Burden Requirement A second issue addressed by courts in these earlier cases concerned the proper function of the centrality inquiry. The courts used the centrality inquiry as a gauge to measure the degree of connection existing between the Indians' practices and their religious beliefs, 48 and reasoned that those practices which were closely related to beliefs were most worthy of free exercise protection. This analysis was expressed by the shorthand formulation that if a practice was "central" to the Indians' beliefs, then impairments of that practice satisfied Yoder's burden requirement. 49 The courts recognized, however, that terms such as "central" were susceptible to shades of meaning, 50 which should not divert the court from its primary evaluation of the connection between the practice and the belief.
Frank v. State 51 constitutes a noteworthy example of this method of analysis. The defendant in Frank, an Athabascan Indian, had taken a moose out of season for use in a religious funeral ceremony, and was charged with violating Alaskan game laws. 52 The Supreme Court of Alaska held that Frank's conduct was protected by the free exercise clause. 53 Performing its burden analysis, the court noted that the religious practice at issue, a funeral potlatch, was the "most important institution in Athabascan life," 54 and was always performed soon after death.
sion"); Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77 ("we encounter no problem as to the bona fide nature of defendants' assertion of the free exercise clause"). But cf. United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 445 (D.D.C. 1968) , discussed in Note, Chemical Sacraments, supra note 39, , where the court found that defendant "had totally failed in her burden to establish her alleged religious beliefs" in the Neo-American Church. See also Note, Chemical Sacraments, supra note 39, , where the author points out that courts applying a good faith standard to their sincerity inquiry will have "considerable evidence" available to aid them.
The sincerity inquiry was adequately handled similarly by courts in the sacred site cases. See notes 86-87 infra and accompanying text.
48. The centrality inquiry played an analogous role in Yoder. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text. In the sacred site cases, the courts carried this inquiry to another level. They focused on the relationship between the site and practice, rather than the relationship between the practice and beliefs. Such an analysis assumed that the land in question had only 11 derivative value for purposes of the free exercise clause -land was to be protected, if at all, so that the court might protect practices performed thereon. Cf. notes 88-140 infra and accompanying text, discussing cases where Indian plaintiffs suggested that the site itself might possess an intrinsic sacredness (that is, a direct connection to beliefs), which alone would warrant free exercise protection. 49. Courts in the sacred site cases, however, did not treat the centrality inquiry merely ns a threshold issue in a free exercise claim, but instead transformed the inquiry into the controlling factor in determining whether claimants' practices were burdened. See notes 174-86 infra and accompanying text.
so. See, e.g .. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 218 (rev. ed. 1975) The Athabascan religion dictated that only native foods could be used in the potlatch. Moose was at the "apex" 55 of these foods; indeed, " [m] oose is the centerpiece of the most important ritual in Athabascan life and is the equivalent of sacred symbols in other religions." 56 Given the importance of moose to a ceremony so closely connected to defendant's beliefs, the court concluded that the game laws' prohibition constituted a burden on a practice important to Athabascan beliefs, and it thus proceeded to the balancing part of its analysis. 57
The court carefully articulated the scope of its burden inquiry. The lower court had found that while moose was very desirable, it was not "specifically required" 58 for the potlatch ceremony; based on this finding, the lower court held that Frank had not been denied his free exercise privileges. The Supreme Court of Alaska explicitly rejected the notion that only practices which were indispensable to the religion might be afforded protection, noting that "absolute necessity is a standard stricter than that which the law imposes. It is sufficient that the practice be deeply rooted in religious belief to bring it within the ambit of the free exercise clause and place on the state its burden of justification. "59 Thus, the court's characterization of moose as the "centerpiece"60 or "cornerstone" of the ritual constituted no more than a description of the significant connection between this practice and Athabascan beliefs, and the terms themselves were not dispositive of the case.61
As in Frank, the defendants in People v. Woody 62 presented strong evidence regarding the importance of the religious practices in question. The court noted that the "cornerstone of the peyote religion" was a ceremony referred to as the "meeting." 63 At these ceremonies, " [t] 1072 -73. Similarly, in Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975 , the court held that a prison regulation prohibiting the defendant, a Cree Indian, from wearing long braided hair violated the free exercise clause. In the course of its Yoder analysis, the court found that wearing long braided hair was a "tenet of the Indian religion." 522 F.2d at 359. As in Frank, the court specifically rejected the notion that defendant had to show that wearing long braided hair was "an absolute tenet of the Indian religion practiced by all Indians." 522 F.2d at 360. See also Note, Chemical Sacraments, supra note 39, at 927-28, (stressing that the Teterud decision did not require any proof of "centrality" of the practice to the Cree beliefs). Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964) , decided by the California Supreme Court on the same day as Woody. In Grady, petitioner, a non-Indian "peyote preacher" and "way shower," pleaded guilty to possession of narcotics. He petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he had used peyote for religious purposes. The court held that Woody meant that "the state may not prohibit the use of peyote in connection with bona fide practice of a religious belief." It then concluded that if defendant's beliefs were held in good faith, he would be entitled to free exercise protection, and remanded on the sincerity question. 61 Cal. 2d at 888, 394 P.2d at 729, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 913. As one commentator has noted, " [n] owhere in the opinion did the court question whether peyote was 'central' to Grady's practices. If peyote was used 'in connection with' the practice of a religious belief, then that, apparently, was enough." Note, Chemical Sacraments, supra note 39, at 889-90. Cf. State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 31, 504 P.2d 950, 954 (1973 ), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974 (in a prosecution under Arizona law for possession of peyote it is a defense if the parties show that peyote "was being used in connection with a bona fide practice of a religious belief; that it was an integral part of the religious exercise; and that it was not used in a manner dangerous to the public health, safety or morals." The court cites Grady for this test, and does not require any further showing of "centrality.").
68 We know that some will urge that it is more important to subserve the rigorous enforcement of the narcotics laws than to carve out of them an exception for a few believers in a strange faith ..•. [Yet] [t]he varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our national life give it depth and beauty. We preserve a greater value than an ancient tradition when we protect the rights of the Indians who honestly practiced an old religion in using peyote one night at a meeting in a desert hogan near Needles, California. 61 Cal. 2d at 727-28, 394 P.2d at 821-22, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78. 71. See, e.g., Frank, 604 P.2d at 1070; State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 29, 504 P.2d 950, 952 (1973 ), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974 Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74; Whitehorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539, 554 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) . Indeed, one explanation for the failure of the Oregon Court of Appeals to follow the Woody exception for peyote use seems to be the court's misunderstanding of the "compelling interest" requirement.
See State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 797-98, 537 P.2d 142, 143-44 (1975 App. 794, 797-98, 537 P.2d 142, 143-44 ( ), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976 . See also Note, Chemical Sacraments, supra § 1307.31 (1986) ("[t] he listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church").
[ Vol. 85:771 sacred site cases, where most of the courts denied Indian religious claims without even considering the merit of the state interests involved. 76 Second, in contrast to courts in the sacred site cases, the earlier courts followed closely Yoder's admonition that the availability of less restrictive alternatives be considered in the balancing analysis. In Teterud v. Burns, 71 the government argued that a series of interests in penal administration justified a regulation limiting prisoners' hair length. The court rejected that claim, noting that less restrictive alternatives existed. For example, the government's interests in sanitary food preparation and the careful and safe operation of machinery could be served by having prisoners with long hair wear hair nets; its interest in ready identification of prisoners could be served by rephotographing those with long hair; and its interest in preventing the hiding of contraband in long hair could adequately be served through normal searches of the prisoners. 7 8 Third, the courts mandated that the asserted state interests be articulated specifically -vague fears or concerns were insufficient to override defendants' free exercise claims. In Frank v. State, for example, the state argued that allowing Athabascans to take moose out of season would trigger "widespread civil disobedience"79 culminating in a pattern of "poaching and creek robbing," 80 which necessitated that no exception be granted defendants. The court rejected this argument completely, holding that "[i]nterests which justify limitations on religious practices must be far more definite than these." 81 In short, courts in the earlier cases uniformly placed far greater emphasis on having the state articulate its interests concretely, with attention to less restrictive alternatives, than do their counterparts in the sacred site cases. 82 religious practices and beliefs. 83 The courts have generally denied plaintiffs relief. This Note argues that in doing so, they have applied the Yoder analysis to the context of Indian religions in an inappropriate manner. Specifically, the courts have overstated the role of the threshold centrality inquiry, thus often unfairly denying to Indian plaintiffs the protection afforded by the Sherbert/Yoder balancing test. 84 Moreover, the few courts that have reached the balancing portion of the analysis often have not accorded proper regard to the Indians' religious interests. 8s
III. THE SACRED SITE CASES
A. Free Exercise and Indian Sacred Sites
Yoder's Threshold Criteria
In all of the cases where they sought free exercise protection of sacred sites, American Indian plaintiffs readily demonstrated that they followed an actual religion in which they sincerely believed.8 6 Similarly, plaintiffs were often able to show that practices performed at the sites were based upon their religious beliefs, as opposed to mere cultural or historical concerns. 87 However, in these cases the courts erroneously transformed Yoder's threshold inquiry regarding the importance or centrality of the claimant's practices to his religious beliefs into the determinative aspect of the burden analysis. 87. See Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740; Northwest Indian Cemetery, 565 F. Supp. 586, 594 (N.D. Cal. 1983 ), modified, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985 , cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 107 S. Ct. 1971 Ct. (1987 . In contrast, in Sequoyah. 620 F.2d at 1163, and lnupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 188-89 (D. Alaska 1982 ), ajfd., 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984 ), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 68 (1985 , both courts suggested that some of the Indian plaintiffs advanced cultural and not religious concerns.
88. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), ajfg., 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979 ), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980 . [Vol. 85:771 and flooding of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River. 89 Plaintiffs argued that land along the Little Tennessee River that would be flooded by the Tellico Reservoir was sacred to their religion. 90 The land was the location of the ancient village of Chota, which had served as a capital, sanctuary, and as the religious "birthplace of the Cherokee. " 91 Not only did the land possess intrinsically sacred qualities, but it also constituted plaintiffs' "connection with the Great Spirit. " 92 In addition, the Cherokees felt that the beliefs and knowledge of their ancestors had been placed into the land where they were buried and that current medicine men obtained their powers by communing with these ancestors. 93 Thus, plaintiffs argued that the TVA's proposed flooding of the land violated their right to free exercise by destroying the sacred and holy character of the area, and denying them the access necessary for pilgrimages and collection of medicines. 94 The 90. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1160. Plaintiffs sought protection for the sacred character of the region itself, in addition to protecting practices they performed there. As one commentator noted, " [t] he Cherokee practice their religion, in part, by worshipping the valley itself; they believe that prayer to and at sacred sites facilitates direct communication with the supernatural world." Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 161 (footnote omitted).
91. 620 F.2d at 1162. One affiant described Chota as "analogous to a Cherokee Jerusalem."
Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 161 n.112.
92. 620 F.2d at 1162. The Cherokee made pilgrimages to the site, during which they recounted the legends and events associated with the site so as to preserve and maintain the content of their religion. One anthropologist commented that " [v] isiting Chota is analogous to reading a Christian bible"; thus, attempting to understand the Cherokee religion in the absence of access to sacred sites "would be like attempting to understand or practice Judaism or Christianity without the Book of Genesis." Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 162 n.115.
93. 620 F.2d at 1162. Indeed, the court at least partly recognized the special role of the site in Cherokee practices and beliefs, noting that "because of their beliefs respecting the transmission of knowledge and spiritual powers to succeeding generations, particular geographic locations figure more prominently in Indian religion and culture than in those of most other people." 620 F.2d at 1163.
94. 620 F.2d at 1160. 95. 620 F.2d at 1164. The term "central" is susceptible of different shades of meaning. By the plaintiffs had "fallen short of demonstrating that worship at the particular geographic location in question is inseparable from the way of life (Yoder), the cornerstone of their religious observance (Frank), or plays the central role in their religious ceremonies and practices (Woody)." 96 Applying this standard, the majority concluded that since the land was not central to the Cherokee practices, the TVA's flooding of the land did not amount to a constitutional burden on plaintiffs' practices and beliefs. 97 Because it found no burden on plaintiffs' practices, the majority did not reach the balancing part of the Yoder test.9 8 The majority also questioned whether plaintiffs' activities at the site were based on religious, as opposed to other, concerns. It suggested that plaintiffs sought to protect Chota primarily for historical and cultural reasons, which constituted a mere "personal preference"99 lying outside the parameters of the free exercise clause. 100 Under Yoder, the court's finding that the practices associated with the site were not "rooted in religious belief" 101 would alone be sufficient to dispose of the case, and the court's application of the centrality standard could thus be viewed as an alternative holding. 102 modifying "central" with the term "indispensable" the court thus made its standard stricter, indicating that only unique sites might even have a chance at some manner of free exercise 953 (1980) . Moreover, in 1979 Congress had directed that the project be completed notwithstanding the provisions of "any other law." 620 F.2d at 1161. Despite its centrality rhetoric, then, the court may well have engaged in an implicit form of balancing in which it determined that the "congressional command" that the project be completed established a compelling governmental interest. 620 F.2d at 1161. In addition, the court emphasized plaintiffs' delay in bringing their claims. Although plaintiffs knew about the project since 1965, this suit had not been filed until "the eve of its [the project's] completion." 480 F. Supp. at 610. See also 620 F.2d at 1162. Although the court did [Vol. 85:771 Several courts have applied the centrality standard articulated in Sequoyah. 103 For example, in Wilson v. Block, 104 the Hopi Indian Tribe, the Navajo Medicinemen's Association, and individual Navajos challenged the federal government's decision permitting private interests to expand the government-owned Snow Bowl ski facilities located on the San Francisco Peaks. 105 Plaintiffs sought the phased removal of all artificial structures on the Peaks, or, at a minimum, an injunction barring further development of the area.1°6
Plaintiffs presented free exercise claims similar to those advanced in Sequoyah. The Navajos argued that the Peaks possessed intrinsically sacred characteristics. They believed that specific Navajo gods resided on the Peaks. 107 Indeed, they considered the mountains themselves as composing the body of a living god, "with various peaks forming the head, shoulders, and knees of a body reclining and facing to the east, while the trees, plants, rocks, and earth form the skin." 108 In addition, the Navajos performed religious ceremonies and gathered ceremonial objects and herbs on the Peaks. 10 9 Similarly, the Hopis believed that the Peaks were sacred because emissaries of the Creator, termed "Kachinas," resided on them for six months each year. These emissaries provided rainfall and helped susnot base its holding on any doctrine of repose, such as !aches, plaintiffs' delay may well have made it easier for the court to deny them relief. Part IV of this Note discusses the need for American Indian claimants to bring suits seeking to protect sacred sites as quickly as possible. Ct. 68 (1985) . In Inupiat, Eskimo plaintiffs sought to quiet title to the area lying from three to sixty-five miles offshore in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas of the Arctic Ocean. 548 F. Supp. at 184-85. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that federal government leasing in the region interfered with practice of their religion on the superjacent sea ice. The court rejected their free exercise claims, holding that since plaintiffs failed to show the significance of the region to their religion, they had not satisfied Yoder's burden requirement. 548 F. Supp. at 188-89. The court supported this decision by relying on the Sequoyah centrality standard. 548 F. Supp. at 189 n.4. See also Note, Native Americans' Access to Religious Sites, supra note 89, at 476-77 (suggesting that the court may also have regarded plaintiffs' claims as "too generalized" to be based on religious, as opposed to other, interests tain the villages. 110 The Hopis had built many shrines on the Peaks and, like the Navajos, they performed ceremonies and collected sacred objects and herbs there. 111 Plaintiffs argued that the proposed expansion of the 777 acre Snow Bowl ski area violated their free exercise rights by diminishing the intrinsic sacredness of the area, insulting their deities, and interfering with their ability to pray and conduct ceremonies on the Peaks.112
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. Relying on the Sequoyah analysis, the court articulated the centrality standard in an even more extreme form than in the earlier case: "We thus hold that plaintiffs seeking to restrict government land use in the name of religious freedom must, at a minimum, demonstrate that the government's proposed land use would impair a religious practice that could not be performed at any other site." 113 The court stressed that this version of the centrality standard was only a minimum, and that satisfying it did not necessarily demonstrate a burden on free exercise.114
Applying this standard, the court held that plaintiffs had failed to show that the small region of the Peaks encompassed by the Snow Bowl was central or indispensable to their religious practices. It noted that plaintiffs would still have free access to the remainder of the Peaks for collecting herbs and objects, and performing ceremonies. 115 As in Sequoyah, the court concluded that since the Snow Bowl was not central to plaintiffs' practices, impairment of that site did not constitute a burden for free exercise purposes. Since it found no burden on 110. 708 F.2d at 738. Thus, as in Sequoyah, plaintiffs argued that the site itself had sacred qualities, apart from the activities conducted there.
111. 708 F.2d at 738. 112. 708 F.2d at 740. 113. 708 F.2d at 744 (footnote omitted). 114. 708 F.2d at 744 n.5. The court's indication that satisfying its strict centrality standard still might not warrant a finding of a burden on free exercise suggests that free exercise protection would be available to few, if any, sites held sacred by American Indians or other groups.
The notion that a site is not deserving of protection if the religious practices can be performed at other places is similar to the position that elements of "mainstream" religious practices are not entitled to protection if substitutes for them exist. The Wilson court's reasoning thus implies that the government could regulate or prohibit Christian practitioners' use of wine, wafer, and other sacraments in their ceremonies without burdening those practices, since substitute products could be used. Because no burden would be said to exist, the government would not even have to assert any interests to justify the regulation or prohibition.
115. 708 F.2d at 744. In narrowing its focus solely to the importance of the connection between the Snow Bowl area and plaintiffs' religious practices and beliefs, the court rejected plaintiffs' assertion that "the mountain as a whole, and not just parts thereof, is considered sacred." 708 F.2d at 744. This analysis seems to conflict with the court's earlier attempt to describe carefully the nature of plaintiffs' practices and beliefs. See notes 105-11 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, the court seemed to be indicating that although the Navajos regarded the entire region as the body of a living god, the government could cut off part of that body without in any way interfering with the Navajo religion.
[Vol. 85:771 plaintiffs' religious beliefs or practices the court did not reach the balancing part of the Yoder test and the question whether "ski area expansion is a compelling governmental interest."116 Moreover, the court rejected plaintiffs' challenges to its use of the centrality standard. Plaintiffs contended that the centrality standard was an overly restrictive way of measuring whether a burden existed on their religious practices and beliefs. They asserted that Sherbert v. Verner 117 and Thomas v. Review Board, 118 and not Sequoyah, established the proper standard for determining whether there was an indirect burden on religious practices and beliefs. 119 Noting that the proposed expansion of the ski facilities "effectively prohibits the practice of their religions," plaintiffs contended that the burden thus created was "greater than that of the practitioners in Sherbert and Thomas, who ... could have continued to practice their beliefs simply by choosing to forego government benefits." 120 The court, however, declined to extend Sherbert and Thomas beyond their specific factual situations, and dismissed the argument. 121 Plaintiffs further contended that the centrality standard, as stated in Sequoyah and adopted by the court, violated the principle that courts are not to inquire into the orthodoxy of a claimant's religious beliefs or practices. 122 The court countered that the Sequoyah standard did not mandate judicial consideration of religious doctrines but 116. 708 F.2d at 745. In another portion of the opinion the court also held that expansion of the ski facilities did not burden plaintiffs' freedom to hold certain beliefs. It rejected plaintiffs' argument that the desecration of the site would force them to modify their religious doctrine, thereby creating a burden on free exercise. 708 F.2d at 740-42.
117. 374 U. S. 398 (1963) . See notes 14-21 supra and accompanying text.
118. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that the board had impermissibly burdened Thomas' free exercise rights by compelling him to choose between the exercise of his rights and an otherwise available public benefit). 121. 708 F.2d at 743. In refusing to extend Sherbert and Thomas beyond the situation where the government attempted to condition benefits on a claimant's decision to follow or forego a religious practice or belief, the court commented that "[t]hose cases did not purport to create a benchmark against which to test all indirect burden claims." 708 F.2d at 743. This reasoning is misleading since many mainstream free exercise cases as well as Indian religion cases treat Sherbert and Thomas, along with Yoder, as leading authorities. One commentator has suggested that courts like Wilson have hesitated to extend free exercise protection beyond the two traditional categories -where plaintiffs "claimed that compliance with a law requires them to violate a tenet of their religion, or claimants have alleged that they will be denied government benefits unless they modify their religious practice." Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra at note 89, at 313 (footnote omitted). See also Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 1460 n.59 (traditional categories of analysis are "inapplicable to Indian belief, since no benefit in the commonly understood sense of the terms flows from government's leaving sacred sites on public lands undisturbed").
122. 708 F.2d at 743. The principle against judicial determinations of orthodoxy is considered more fully at notes 177-79 infra.
rather focused "solely upon the importance of the geographic site in question to the practice of the plaintiffs' religion." 123 The court reasoned that if the site were central to the practice, it might warrant protection even if the practice itself was not central to plaintiffs' beliefs.124 It thus denied this challenge to the centrality standard. 125 b. Coercive effects. In Crow v. Gullet, 126 the court articulated an alternative means of determining whether a burden on claimants' practices and beliefs existed. In Crow, traditional chiefs and spiritual leaders of the Tsistsistas Nation and the Lakota Nation challenged the state's construction of roads, bridges, parking lots and similar access facilities at Bear Butte. 127 Plaintiffs sought an injunction halting the construction and ordering the removal of artificial structures near the site. 128
Plaintiffs introduced numerous affidavits and several witnesses to establish the site's religious significance. The Lakota asserted that Bear Butte was intrinsically sacred, as it was the place where the tribe "originally met with the Great Spirit." 12 9 In addition, the region was "the most significant site of Lakota religious ceremonies," 13 0 and the deeply religious "Vision Quest" 131 was performed there. Similarly, the Tsistsistas made pilgrimages to and performed religious ceremonies at "an all-important vision from a personal guardian spirit. This vision will guide the recipient throughout his or her life, and is often an essential part of the transition from youth to adulthood").
[Vol. 85:771 the site. 13 2 Plaintiffs contended that the construction violated their free exercise rights by desecrating the sacred area at the foot of the Butte, and diminishing the "power of the Butte as a ceremonial ground." 133
The district court denied the claims, holding that plaintiffs had failed to establish that the construction placed an improper burden on their free exercise rights. 134 In performing its burden analysis, however, the court did not use a centrality standard. Rather, it held that to demonstrate a burden on their practices plaintiffs had to "show the coercive effect of the [restriction] as it operates against the practice of their religion." 135 In prior cases this coercive effect standard had been satisfied in two types of situations: where, as in Yoder, the government regulation forced practitioners to violate the tenets of their religion, and where, as in Sherbert and Thomas, the government conditioned receipt of public benefits on claimants' foregoing their religious practices.136 The court noted that the Indian plaintiffs might meet the coercive effect standard by showing that their situation was analogous to those in Yoder or Sherbert,· alternatively, plaintiffs could satisfy the standard by demonstrating that "their conduct in the course of exercising their beliefs has been unduly restricted."1 37 The court held, however, that the construction did not have a coercive effect on plaintiffs' religious practices. It stressed that plaintiffs had not sufficiently elaborated how particular Lakota and Tsistsistas ceremonies carried out on the Butte were impaired by building of roads and bridges at the foot of the Butte. 138 Indeed, there was some indication that many Indians themselves did not think that the construction burdened their practices -the state park manager testified that "numerous Indian religious campers requested that the State provide safer and better access to the ceremonial grounds." 139 Courts other than Crow have also employed a coercive effects analysis. However, the standard has not yet gained unequivocal acceptance. 140
Balancing Indian Religious Interests Against Government Development Interests
Badoni v. Higginson 141 was one of the few cases in which a court ruling on sacred site issues reached the balancing part of the Yoder analysis. 142 In Badoni, individual Navajos, several Navajo medicine dard, courts such as the one in Crow focused too greatly on the intent as opposed to the result of the government regulations).
138. 541 F. Supp. at 791. By focusing on the impairment of specific ceremonies, the court implicitly rejected any argument that the Butte as a whole was sacred and that an infringement of any portion of the site constituted a burden on free exercise.
139. 541 F. Supp. at 791. Moreover, the court seemed to be strongly influenced by the state's earlier attempts to accommodate the Indians' religious practices. For example, religious campers had been granted a special area apart from that used by the general public. Religious campers could acquire permits to stay on the Butte longer than other campers, and they did not have to follow any established platforms or trails at the site. 541 F. Supp (1983) . One of plaintiffs' claims in Crow was that the state had burdened their religious practices by closing the Butte area for overnight camping during the period of construction of the access road and parking lot. In rejecting this claim the district court relied on a type of balancing analysis. It held that the state had a "compelling interest" in finishing the projects, based on administrative and environmental concerns. In addition, the court noted that closing the site temporarily during construction was a "least restrictive men, and three chapters of the Navajo Nation sought an injunction in connection with the federal government's operation of the Glen Canyon Dam and Reservoir, and its management of the Rainbow Bridge National Monument.143
The Rainbow Bridge, a large sandstone arch, was located within the 160 acre Rainbow Bridge National Monument. 144 Plaintiffs regarded the Rainbow Bridge, a nearby prayer spot, spring, and cave as sacred areas, holding "positions of central importance" in their religion.145 They considered these geological formations as the "incarnate forms of Navajo gods," who provided them with rainfall and protection.146 Moreover, before the area was flooded, plaintiffs performed religious ceremonies near the Bridge, and used water from the spring for conducting other ceremonies. 147
The federal government had created a reservoir behind the Glen Canyon Dam and had subsequently filled it to a high level. The reservoir had, in turn, flooded the sacred canyon located near the Rainbow Bridge. 148 Plaintiffs alleged that in flooding this canyon and in creatmeans" of completing the project quickly and with minimal danger to public safety and the environment. 541 F. Supp. at 792.
Yet, prior to considering the strength of the state's interest, the court had already suggested that the overnight closing of the site did not place any burden on plaintiffs' religious practices because no person had ever been denied access for religious purposes. 541 F. Supp 144. 638 F.2d at 175. Although it was surrounded by the Navajo reservation, the monument was public land administered by the National Park Service.
145. 638 F.2d at 177. 146. 638 F.2d at 177. The Navajo's belief that living gods inhabited such natural objects may have stemmed from "the fact that several of the canyon's rock formations resemble human beings with Native American facial characteristics." Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 160 n.105. In addition, the Navajo believed that the Rainbow Bridge itself was inhabited by two gods, one male, one female, who had transformed themselves into stone after aiding two Navajo children in moving from the land of the gods across the canyon to the land of humans. Navajos called the mountain near the Rainbow Bridge "Head of Earth," and regarded it as the earth god's crown. Similarly, gods known as Water People lived in rivers, springs, rainbows and serpents, and collaborated to provide the Navajos with rainfall. Id. at 160 n.105-09, which also discusses K. LUCKERT, NAVAJO MOUNTAIN AND RAINBOW BRIDGE RELIGION (1977) .
147. 638 F.2d at 177. In one such ceremony, the Navajos requested rain by "taking water from a sacred spring located in the canyon floor and ceremoniously depositing it in another spring located on the top of Head of Earth .... " Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 160 n.108.
148. 638 F.2d at 175-77. The court noted that " (b] ecause of the operation of the Dam and Lake Powell [the reservoir], the springs and prayer spot are under water." 638 F.2d at 177. ing a tourist attraction, the government had drowned some of their gods, destroyed the sacred character of the site, and denied them access to the prayer spots necessary to their ceremonies, thereby violating the free exercise clause. 14 9
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. Without addressing the question whether the government's actions infringed on plaintiffs' free exercise of religion, the court nevertheless held that "the government's interest in maintaining the capacity of Lake Powell at a level that intrudes into the Monument outweighs plaintiffs' religious interest." 150 The court noted that the dam and reservoir were key elements in a water storage and power generation project that covered several states. In order to alleviate the alleged infringements on plaintiffs' practices, the reservoir's surface level would have to be dropped so far that its storage capacity would be cut in half. 151 Such a reduction would greatly lessen the water available to several states for irrigation, development of natural resources, and municipal and industrial uses. 152 Moreover, the court concluded that since the reservoir had to be maintained at the current level and no other action besides reducing the level could eliminate the alleged infringements on plaintiffs' religious practices, there was no less restrictive manner in which the government could attain its interests. 153 The 149. 638 F.2d at 176-77. One of the drowned gods was Talking Rock, a collection of eight Rock People who lived on the floor of the Canyon. These Rock People heard every word spoken in their vicinity and in turn informed the Navajos when ceremonies ought to be performed.
Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 145 n.30 and 160 n.106.
Plaintiffs also contended that the government had violated their free exercise rights by permitting tourists to visit the Rainbow Bridge, because tourists had desecrated the sacred character of the area, and interfered with plaintiffs' performance of their ceremonies. 683 F.2d at 176-77. The court held, however, that the establishment clause precluded the government from excluding tourists from the site. It argued that " [w] ere it otherwise, the Monument would become a government-managed religious shrine." 638 F.2d at 179. This establishment clause issue is also discussed in Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, 150. 638 F.2d at 177 & n.4. The court explicitly rested its decision on the balancing analysis, rejecting the lower court's finding that plaintiffs' lack of a property interest in the Monument barred relief. It stressed that the "government must manage its property in a manner that does not offend the Constitution." 638 F.2d at 176. See also Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979 Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson 155 was the first case in which American Indian plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining free exercise protection for a sacred site. In Northwest, members of the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa tribes, several associations, and the state of California challenged the United States Forest Service's decision to build a section of the "G-0" road through the Blue Creek Unit of Six Rivers National Forest, and to adopt a plan permitting timber harvesting in that Unit.156 Plaintiffs contended that the entire northeastern corner of the Blue Creek Unit constituted a sacred region known as "high country."157 Since the early nineteenth century, members of the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa tribes had performed religious ceremonies in the high country, and they continued to do so. 158 For example, tribal members used "prayer seats" located on the highest mountain peaks of the region to "seek religious guidance or personal 'power' through 'engaging in emotional [and] spiritual exchange with the creator.' " 15 9 Crucial participants in ceremonies such as the White Deerskin and Jump Dances journeyed to the region prior to the ceremony in order to fabricate medicines and to purify themselves. Medicine women visited the high country to obtain "healing power" and to gather important medicines. 160 Plaintiffs emphasized that the efficacy of such ceremonies depended strongly on the maintenance of "the solitude, quietness, 154. 635 F.2d at 175-77. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text. In short, the court held that the government had a "compelling interest" in water storage and power generation, such interest had been specifically articulated, and no less restrictive alternatives existed. Yet, the court's holding that the government's interest was compelling even though it had not explicitly decided whether plaintiffs' practices had been burdened, suggests that it was not applying the Yoder balancing analysis in a truly comparative manner. See notes 190-92 infra and accompanying text.
155. 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983 ), modified, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985 , cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 107 S. Ct. 1971 Ct. (1987 and pristine environment found in the high country." 161 Plaintiffs asserted that construction of the section of road and the allowance of timber harvesting would violate their free exercise rights in several ways. First, the road would "dissect the high country," diminishing the region's inherent sacredness. 162 In addition to noise arising from the construction and use of the road, its visibility from the peaks would destroy the "pristine visual conditions" necessary for performance of plaintiffs' religious ceremonies. Similarly, intensive harvesting of timber would result in serious "adverse visual, aural, and environmental impacts . . . on the high country's salient religious characteristics." 163
The district court upheld plaintiffs' free exercise claims, enjoining road construction and timbering in the high country. 164 Although the court reached a different result, its method of applying the Yoder analysis did not vary greatly from the approach used by courts in earlier cases.
In determining whether the proposed government actions placed a burden on plaintiffs' religious practices, the court relied on Sequoyah 's centrality standard. It noted that the high country comprised the. "center of the spiritual world" of the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa tribes, and that "[n]o other geographic areas or sites hold equivalent religious significance for these tribes." 165 Indeed, maintenance of the region's pristine qualities was "central and indispensable" to the performance of plaintiffs' religious ceremonies. 166 Since use of the high country was central to plaintiffs' religious practices, and the proposed road and timbering interfered with such usage, the government had improperly burdened plaintiffs' free exercise of religion. 167 The court distinguished the results in earlier cases such as Sequoyah by holding that the current plaintiffs had made a stronger factual showing of centrality than had their counterparts in those cases.16s perceive power in relational terms, the Indian practitioners seemed to regard power as a tangible substance which could be obtained and subsequently channeled toward healing.
161 (where the court rejected the assertion that the region as a whole was sacred); see also note 121 supra.
Turning to the balancing part of its analysis, the court found that the government had failed to demonstrate the compelling interests necessary to justify such an infringement on plaintiffs' free exercise of religion. The extra section of the road would not materially improve access to timber resources existing in the Blue Creek Unit, and thus would not lead to any increase in the number of jobs in the local timber industry.1 69 Because the Forest Service was currently able to provide all required services to the high country, the road was not necessary to "improve the efficient administration" of the region.1 7 o Similarly, the court noted that the timber contained in the high country constituted a small portion of all the timber located in the entire Six Rivers National Forest. The harvesting of such timber would not greatly alter supplies; nor would the local timber industry suffer if it was denied access to timber in the region. Furthermore, the court held that even if the government could show a substantial need for harvesting more timber in the Blue Creek Unit, it could use "means less restrictive of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights" to satisfy those goals. m
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court opinion. In a narrowly written decision, the Ninth Circuit approved the district court's reliance on the Sequoyah centrality standard. Quoting extensively from the district court opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court's findings that there was a burden on plaintiffs' religious practices and that the government's interest did not outweigh this religious interest were not clearly erroneous. 172
C. Problems with the Sacred Site Cases
This section of the Note considers several common problems that arise from courts' extension of the Yoder analysis to the sacred site context. 173 Part IV then proposes a way of adapting Yoder so that these problems are avoided.
Burdens on Sites and Practices
As the preceding sections demonstrate, significant analytical problems are engendered by the use of the centrality standard to determine burdens, as was mandated by Sequoyah. As an initial matter, the courts unduly exaggerated portions of Yoder and the earlier Indian religion cases. For example, while Yoder provided that the impor-169. 565 F. Supp. at 595-96. 170. 565 F. Supp. at 596. 171. 565 F. Supp. at 596-97. 172. 764 F.2d 581, 586-87 (9th Cir. 1985) . The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in this case, 107 S. Ct. 1971 Ct. (1987 .
173. Since this section of the Note focuses only on problem areas, it omits discussion of Yoder's threshold criteria besides the centrality inquiry. See notes 86-90 supra.
tance of claimants' practices to their religious beliefs was just one threshold issue involved in stating a free exercise claim, 174 courts in cases such as Sequoyah transformed it into the sole mechanism for determining whether plaintiffs' practices had been burdened, thereby distorting the remainder of the Yoder analysis.1 75 Similarly, these courts justified the centrality inquiry as deriving from language in earlier cases such as Frank and Woody. Yet those cases used the centrality language as simply one way to describe these results, and not as the controlling standard for evaluating claimed infringements on religious practices.17 6 Moreover, the overextension of the centrality standard raises some larger policy questions regarding the propriety of judicial inquiries in this area. To begin with, the courts' reliance on the centrality standard often conflicts with the well established principle prohibiting extensive judicial investigations of orthodoxy. 177 In Sequoyah, for example, the court's finding that the Little Tennessee Valley was not central or indispensable to Cherokee religious practices amounted to a judicial conclusion regarding the relative merit of a given site and ceremonies performed thereon to the Cherokee religion. 178 In rejecting plaintiffs' contention that the mountain as a whole and not just the Snow Bowl region was sacred, the Wilson court may well have inquired too far into the merits of Navajo beliefs themselves (as opposed to merely examining the sincerity with which those beliefs were held). 179
174. See notes 24-32 supra and accompanying text. 175. See Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 329 n.119 (arguing that the sacred site courts' reliance on centrality as the primary means for ascertaining whether a burden exists on plaintiffs' practices is especially inappropriate since "[n]one of the major non-Indian religion cases have mentioned centrality"); Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 1463 (pointing out the "methodological gap between standard free exercise analysis and Indian site·specific religious belief").
176. See notes 48·68 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 324 (describing how the centrality approach, first used as an attempt to explain the unfamiliar, "hardened into an ironclad requirement").
177. This principle was stated by the Supreme Court in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("[i] fthere is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion"); see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) ("religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection"); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) ("[I] t is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment.").
178. See notes 88-106 supra and accompanying text. Cf Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 1461 (warning that the centrality inquiry in the site cases has impermissibly "evolved into an examination of the 'doctrinal pedigree' of a religious belief"). A second problem with the centrality inquiry is that it prompts judges who are usually educated in Judeo-Christian religions to depend on "familiar criteria" in evaluating qualitatively different Indian religions.1 8 0 Courts in Woody and Frank properly used such familiar criteria in explaining and understanding the Indian religions involved in those cases. 1 8 1 By contrast, the sacred site cases suggest that unless the relationship of site, practice, and belief accord with the JudeoChristian model, Indian plaintiffs will probably be denied free exercise protection. For example, the Inupiat court's difficulty in perceiving a religious practice that occurred upon superjacent sea ice as legitimate no doubt contributed to its denial of plaintiffs' claims. 182 Evaluating Indian religions solely in terms of their Judeo-Christian counterparts is not only unworkable, but again seems to violate the principle against judicial determinations of orthodoxy. 1 83
Moreover, the use of familiar criteria as a means of evaluating sacred site claims raises a unique problem in sacred site cases. In considering various sacred site claims, courts focused on the availability of alternative areas in which plaintiffs could perform their ceremonies. 184 Since access to specific sites is far less important in Judeo-Christian religions than in Indian religions, courts may well view plaintiffs as being required merely to move from one outdoor "church" to another. 181. See notes 48-68 supra and accompanying text. One commentator points out that in Woody the court "referred to centrality to explain how that unfamiliar practice fit into an unfamiliar religion, and why prohibiting the use of peyote would violate the Indians' free exercise rights" and yet this "attempt to explain the unfamiliar ... hardened into an ironclad requirement in later Indian cases." Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 324. 182. See note 103 supra and accompanying text. This problem is further illustrated by an exchange in the district court opinion in Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977 ), affd., 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980 ), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981 . Questioning the relationship between the Rainbow Bridge Monument and plaintiffs' religious practices, the district court noted that a small number of individuals had carried out infrequent religious ceremonies in the area. Plaintiffs countered that Navajo ceremonies "are not periodic ceremonies .•• [but] are performed when needed, and requested by an individual or family." 455 F. Supp. at 646. Despite this contention, the district court held that the small number of ceremonies performed in the region in part justified the denial of plaintiffs' claims. Its reliance on familiar patterns of church attendance made the court insensitive to plaintiffs' arguments.
183. See Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 1461 (the centrality inquiry promotes a narrowing of "the scope of free exercise protection to familiar and well-documented religious tenets, despite the Supreme Court's statement that the First Amendment knows no orthodoxy") (footnote omitted).
184. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 956 (1983) , where the court noted that although development would impair practices carried on in the Snow Bowl area, plaintiffs would still have free access to the rest of the Peaks for collecting herbs and objects, and performing ceremonies. See notes 103-26 supra and accompanying text.
Yet, this familiar analogy is misleading. One commentator on Indian religions has noted that:
[O]nce a site is chosen by the gods as a place of sacred value, that sacredness continues to reside there for eternity and cannot be annulled (by mere transportation by humans to another location). Sacred places transcend human history and are places of inexhaustible power and spiritual energy. They are not merely sites of convenience. 1 8 5
Consideration of alternative sites is thus often meaningless unless it is conducted from the perspective of the Indian religion itself. 186
Balancing Indian Religious Interests Against Government Development Interests
In Sherbert and Yoder, the Supreme Court set out guidelines for assessing governmental interests offered to justify disputed regulations. The Court provided that only "compelling state interests" which were concretely articulated could override claimants' free exercise rights. Moreover, the government also had to demonstrate that no less restrictive means for achieving its interests existed. 187 This method of analysis was accurately and fully applied by the court in Northwest. 188 While the other courts that reached the balancing stage of the analysis mostly followed Yoder's guidelines, 189 their analysis has often been problematic.
First, courts have failed to keep separate their consideration of Indian and government interests. For example, in Badoni the court found that the government's interest in maintaining the reservoir at a high level was compelling even though it had not first decided whether plaintiffs' religious practices had been burdened. This suggests that the court believed that the governmental interest was sufficient to override any possible religious interest that plaintiffs might advance. 1 9° This invocation of a "predetermined overriding governmental interest" 191 ignores the comparative quality of the balancing approach. 188. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 594-97 (N.D. Cal. 1983 ), modified, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985 , cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 107 S. Ct. 1971 Ct. (1987 ; see notes 169-72 supra and accompanying text.
189. Two other cases where courts reached the balancing stage of the Yoder analysis were Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982 ), ajfd., 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983 ), and Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977 ), ajfd., 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980 ), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981 .
190. See notes 141-54 supra and accompanying text. 191. Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 1456 n.37. [Vol. 85:771 Under Yoder, governmental interests are not measured according to an absolute standard; rather, the court's assessment of the governmental interest is colored by its simultaneous consideration of the burdened religious practices. By refusing to ascertain whether a burden existed on plaintiffs' practices, and if so, the extent of burden present, the Badoni court improperly applied the balancing analysis. 192 Second, courts attempting to determine whether less restrictive means exist are often hampered by the timing of sacred site litigation. If the action is not brought until the government project has been mostly completed, the inquiry is unlikely to uncover truly viable alternative means. 193 This timing problem in part explains the different results reached in Badoni and Northwest. In Badoni, the less restrictive means analysis was performed after the dam and reservoir had been completed, and the demands of the multi-state water storage system made clear that the reservoir would have to be maintained at its existing high level. Since an established project was almost by definition less costly and more efficient than any possible alternative, the court's consideration of less restrictive means was not fruitful. 1 94 By contrast, in Northwest the less restrictive means analysis was performed before the road was built or timbering had commenced, when truly workable alternatives existed. 194. Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977 ), a.ffd., 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980 ), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981 ; see notes 141-62 supra and accompanying text; see also Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 333 (in Badoni, "[W] here accommodation would have meant both a complete win for the Indians and a complete loss for the government, the courts were reluctant to apply the tests in a way that would mandate accommodation.").
195. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983 ), modified, 164 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985 Legislatures and administrative agencies may be as well equipped as courts to resolve conflicts between Indian religious interests and government developmental interests, particularly when an issue is raised prior to government construction of the project. 1 96 Several recent statutes seek to provide Indian sacred sites with some measure of protection from government development.
For example, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act 1 9 7 provides that as of 1978 "it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise [their] traditional religions ... including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rights." 198 To achieve this goal, the Act requires administrative agencies to reexamine their procedures and policies, and alter them where it is necessary to eliminate government interference with Indian religious practices.199
Despite its protective language, however, the Act has not been a controlling factor in the sacred site cases. Courts treat the Act simply as a congressional recognition of Indians' free exercise rights that does not provide plaintiffs with any independent protections. Thus, "where a traditional free exercise analysis has been applied and either a lack of infringement or an overriding governmental interest found, courts have not felt obligated to enforce more than consultation with Indian religious leaders by federal agencies." 200 No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (current version at 42 u.s.c. § 1996 (1982) ).
[ Vol. 85:771 ernment development interests might be alleviated by a strengthening of the Act. 201
B. Adapting the Yoder Analysis to Sacred Site Context
Threshold Criteria Other than Centrality
The Yoder analysis requires claimants to demonstrate that they sincerely follow an actual religion and that the practices for which they seek protection are based on religious, as opposed to cultural or historical, concerns. 202 These threshold criteria should be retained in the sacred lands context. They did not create undue disputes in the cases, 203 and indeed they contributed positively to free exercise analysis. For example, the threshold criteria strain out frivolous actions where parties attempt to use first amendment claims as a guise to block development they actually oppose for nonreligious reasons. 204 Furthermore, by clearly satisfying these criteria, Indian plaintiffs may well add a measure of legitimacy to their claims. 2 os 2. Burdens on Sites and Practices a. Limiting the centrality inquiry. Preceding sections demonstrated that courts have often misapplied Yoder's centrality standard in the sacred site cases. The seeming unfairness which has resulted from such misapplication can only be avoided in the future if the centrality inquiry is restored to the limited threshold function initially ment, supra note 89, at 328 (discussing court's finding that "the Act was not meant to grant rights in excess of first amendment guarantees").
201. In a recent case one court appears to have given greater weight to AIRFA. In United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247, 266-69 (D.S.D. 1985) , the district court found that a Forest Service official's failure to consult meaningfully with Indian religious leaders regarding a special use permit for the Black Hills conflicted with AIRFA; the court concluded that denial of the permit was arbitrary and capricious. Similarly, the AIRFA Report recounts several instances where the Act prompted Indian tribes and a governmental agency to reach a compromise agreement concerning access to sacred sites. AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Acr REPORT 55-58 (1979) . See also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § § 5097.9-.99 (Deering 1984 & 1986 (establishing a moratorium on the disturbance of Indian burial grounds and creating a task force to identify archeological and historical sites in consultation with tribal representatives); EchoHawk, supra note 158, at 7 (after noting that "[i]n instances where practitioners have sacred areas located on public lands which are not in imminent danger, tribes should consider lobbying for protective legislation," the author lists a variety of existing federal statutes that could be interpreted so as to provide for protection of sacred sites); Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 1457 n.49.
202. See notes 25-30 supra and accompanying text.
203. For example, the parties often stipulated that plaintiffs meet these threshold criteria.
See note 86 supra.
204. An analogous problem occurred in the cases involving peyote use by members of the Native American Church, where non-Indians sought to take advantage of the Church's exemption under the drug laws. See notes 40-47 supra and accompanying text.
205. Cf Echo-Hawk, supra note 158, at 8 (noting that it is crucial for Indian advocates to convince judges of the nature and gravity of their sacred site claims).
outlined in Yoder. 206 Instead of controlling the analysis, the centrality inquiry would operate simply as one way for the court to examine the asserted connection between a particular site and plaintiffs' religious practices. The recent case of United States v. Means 207 is a good example of this more limited approach. In Means, a group of Indians established a religious campsite on public lands located in the Black Hills National Forest. The Forest Service denied the group a special use permit and sought a court order directing them to leave the site. 208 While the district court engaged in a centrality inquiry, it stressed that centrality was just part of, and not determinative of, its analysis. 209 If the problems arising from the courts' earlier use of the standard are to be avoided entirely, the courts must inquire into centrality from the viewpoint of the Indian religion involved. As one commentator noted, "[i]f the focus is to be one of centrality, it becomes essential that courts inquire into the significance of governmental actions in the context of the affected religion." 210 This approach is particularly needed here, insofar as Indian religious practices and beliefs are so unfamiliar to judges and lawyers raised in the Judea-Christian tradition. [Vol. 85:771 b. Focusing on actual burdens. With the centrality inquiry carefully limited, courts could then properly follow Sherbert and Yoder, and conduct the burden analysis by focusing on actual interferences with claimants' religious practices. For example, in Sherbert the Supreme Court held that by forcing the appellant to choose between following the tenets of her religion and foregoing benefits, or abandoning one of the precepts of her religion to obtain benefits, the state imposed a burden on her free exercise rights. 211 Thus, to satisfy the burden requirement, appellant simply had to demonstrate that the state regulation, as a practical matter, interfered significantly with the exercise of her religion. She did not have to show that the state action would totally prevent her from practicing her religion.
Similarly, in Yoder the Court held that since the compulsory education law exposed Amish children to worldly influences, attitudes, and goals that conflicted with their beliefs and impaired the adolescent child's integration into the Amish community, it amounted to a burden on defendants' religious practices. 212 The Court again stressed the practical interference with defendants' free exercise of their religion. 21 3 The emphasis on actual burdens on claimants' religious practices could be readily transferred to the sacred site context. The analysis of the district court in United States v. Means 214 illustrates this method. After completing a limited centrality inquiry, 2 1 5 the Means court addressed whether the Forest Service restrictions on use of and access to the Black Hills burdened the Lakota Indians' free exercise rights. It noted that:
The Supreme Court has not set forth a precise test for determining whether or not a burden exists. To answer this question, a court or agency must take a sensible and realistic look at the facts and circumstances of the case and then decide whether there.exists a real negative impact upon the exercise of religion that is significant enough to be labeled a burden. 216 Applying this formulation, the court held that because the Forest Service regulations restricted "when, where, and how the ceremonies are conducted" 217 in the Black Hills, they imposed "a significant negative 211. 374 U.S. at 404. The Court added that the regulations interfered with "cardinal principles" of appellant's religion. 374 U.S. at 406. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
212. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
213. Having found a burden on defendants' religious practices, the Court proceeded to describe the character of that burden, noting that the compulsory education law posed the "very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist today." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) . See note 34 supra and accompanying text. 214. 627 F. Supp. 247 (D.S.D. 1985) .
215. See notes 207-09 supra and accompanying text.
216. 627 F. Supp. at 258. 217. 627 F. Supp. at 263. Specifically, the regulations restricted the location of claimants' religious campsite, and limited the manner in which their ceremonies were conducted. The Forest Service also imposed a fee for use of the region. 627 F. 263. impact" on the Lakota religious practices, which satisfied the burden requirement. 218 Indian plaintiffs ill sacred site cases would probably be more successful in meeting the practical burden standard than they have been under the previous approach. 219 Yet, because the standard ultimately depends on a factual, case-by-case inquiry, it would not result in an undue expansion of the number of sacred site cases occupying the courts. 220
Balancing Indian Religious Interests Against Government Development Interests
Since Indian religious practitioners and government officials possess vastly and qualitatively different interests regarding sacred lands, it is unhelpful for courts to consider the balancing analysis as a mere "weighing" of rival concerns upon some equivalent "scale." 221 Rather, the court is in essence rendering a value judgment that resolves conflicts over land use in a particular situation. The balancing analysis should primarily serve to guide the court in understanding and comparing the various interests so that it can best make such judgments. 222 a. Indian religious interests. In the sacred site cases, plaintiffs have asserted a variety of interferences with their free exercise rights: they 218. 627 F. Supp. at 263. The Means court's practical approach to the burden analysis is analogous to the "coercive effects" standard advanced by the court in Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. 221. The "scale" metaphor is particularly troubling because it implies that to prevail on an uncertain free exercise claim all Indian plaintiffs need do is "add" another fact to their side by showing another religious use for the site. This obscures the fact that the court is ultimately making a value judgment.
222. This view of the balancing process accords with the parameters established by the Supreme Court in Yoder and Sherbert. See notes 14-36 supra and accompanying text. For example, in comparing the divergent interests the court will still require that the government have a "compelling interest" in the development project.
[ Vol. 85:771 have argued that government activities destroyed the intrinsically holy character of the site, inhibited practitioners from performing both infrequent and common ceremonies on sacred lands, prevented worshippers from collecting sacred herbs, objects, and medicines, and diminished the general religious and cultural value of the region. 223 The first amendment mandates that a court consider the severity of such alleged infringements from the perspective of the affected Indian religion. 224 While a judge may personally believe, for example, that the inability to obtain sacred eagle feathers does not particularly frustrate Indian religious practices, he should defer to the plaintiffs if they offer sincere and good faith assertions to the contrary. 225 This process allows the Indians themselves to participate in valuing a given site for purposes of the balancing analysis. 22 6 b. Government development interests. After analyzing the extent of infringement on plaintiffs' religious practices, the court should address the government interests asserted to justify the development project. Courts should follow the method outlined in Sherbert and Yoder, which the court in Northwest recently extended to the sacred site context. 227 Pursuant to this method, the government must demonstrate a "compelling interest" in the project. The government cannot simply assert general interests in irrigation or economic development -the need for a particular project at a particular site must be carefully demonstrated. 228 223. This section assumes that Indian plaintiffs have already demonstrated an actual interference with their religious practices and the court is evaluating the degree of infringement which exists. See notes 88-172 supra and accompanying text.
224. See Part I supra. 225. See United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247, 254 (D.S.D. 1985) (stressing the impor· tance of taking into account "subjective criteria" of the Indian religion); Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 1469 (the balancing analysis should "assess the degree of harm threatened to a traditional Indian religion by proposed development of a sacred site in the con· text of the tribal religion itself"); Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 335 (courts should assess Indian religious practices "in their own terms").
226. Viewed from the perspective of the Indian religion, the infringements may be of such severity that few, if any, accommodations to development are possible. For example, plaintiffs might assert that an entire region and not just part of it was highly important to their religious practices and could not be disturbed. Compare Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983) , and notes 103-26 supra, with Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983 ), modified, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985 , cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 107 S. Ct. 1971 Ct. (1987 , and notes 155-72 supra.
In the majority of the cases, however, the religion may well permit some form of compromise with governmental development. See the discussion of Northwest at notes 155-72 supra (address· ing the possibility of fashioning "protective zones"); see also Means, 627 F. Supp. at 259, 264 (religious practitioners willing to accept an alternative which granted them exclusive religious use of only 800 acres within the Black Hills and precluded them from building any permanent structures in the region).
227. 565 F. Supp. 586, ; see notes 174-76, 188 supra and accompanying text. 228. See notes 187-89 supra and accompanying text. Courts could develop categories of in· terests that have the potential for qualifying as "compelling." They could thus find that while the construction of dams, water projects, or roads may in certain circumstances amount to com-Furthermore, Indian plaintiffs should file sacred site claims as rapidly as possible. Early filing will enable the court to focus on the possible existence of less restrictive means for achieving the government's goals without having its analysis skewed by preexisting commitment of substantial government resources to the project.2 2 9 If government agencies learn that courts will employ a strict less restrictive means standard, they may be more likely to consider viable alternatives when they are initially planning the project.230
Finally, having determined the extent of infringement on plaintiffs' religious practices from the perspective of the Indian religion, and having analyzed the asserted compelling government interests in light of less restrictive alternatives, the court should carefully compare the rival interests. There may be situations where either party's interest, when viewed on its own terms, is so strong that the court must find entirely in favor of the Indians or entirely in favor of the government. The court should focus, however, on achieving measured accommodations of the competing interests, and this focus should inform the court's shaping of appropriate relief. 2 31 pelling interests, the expansion of a ski lodge, however it is justified, cannot constitute such an 231. For example, the Means court, considering the appropriate relief for the first amendment violation, noted that it was "not in a position to nor does it want to draw the blueprints for [Vol. 85:771 
CONCLUSION
The sacred site cases provide a vivid example of courts attempting to apply conventional free exercise analysis to a new and unfamiliar setting. So far such attempts have been incomplete and at times unduly harmful to Indian religious concerns. The courts' use of centrality exceeds the inquiry required by Yoder and the earlier Indian religion cases, conflicts with the principle against judicial determinations of orthodoxy, and encourages improper reliance on familiar criteria as standards for measuring sacred site claims. Moreover, courts' efforts at balancing Indian religious interests and government development interests do not take into account the different natures of the two sets of interests, and are frequently conducted too late in the development process for evaluation of less restrictive alternatives to be meaningful.
Several modifications to conventional free exercise analysis will remedy these problems. Most significantly, once the centrality inquiry is restored to its original limited role, courts will properly be able to focus on actual interferences with religious practices, as they are perceived from the perspective of the Indian religion. They will then be able to compare carefully such interferences with asserted compelling governmental interests, while paying particular attention to existing less restrictive alternatives. In short, these modifications will be relatively easy for courts to implement, and will ensure fairer and more consistent consideration of American Indians' important religious concerns.
-Mark S. Cohen a Lakota religious camp." 627 F. Supp. 247, 271 (D.S.D. 1985) . Instead, the court required the parties to work out an acceptable compromise regarding Lakota religious practices in the Black Hills, and specified that no appeals could be taken until such relief had been arranged. 627 F. 
